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Abstract 
We study the effect of dividend taxes on the payout and investment policy of listed firms and 
discuss their implications for agency problems. To do so, we exploit a unique setting in 
Switzerland where some, but not all, firms were suddenly able to pay tax-exempted dividends 
to their shareholders following the corporate tax reform of 2011. Using a difference-in-
differences specification, we show that treated firms increased their payout much more than 
control firms after the tax cut. Differently, treated firms did not concurrently or subsequently 
increase investment. We show that the tax-inelasticity of investment was due to a significant 
drop in retained earnings  ̶  as the rise in dividends was not compensated by an equally-sized 
reduction in share repurchases. Furthermore, treated firms did not raise more equity and/or did 
not reduce their cash holdings to compensate for the contraction in retained earnings. Finally, 
we show that an unintended consequence of cutting dividend taxes is to mitigate the agency 
problems that arise between insiders and minority shareholders. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Does changing corporate taxes materially affect firms’ behavior? Amid conflicting theories, 
mixed empirical conclusions, and lavish promises made by politicians, the value of the tax-
elasticity of payout and investment remains unknown in most contexts. In this paper, we study 
the effect of abruptly removing the dividend tax for some, but not all, firms by exploiting a 
fiscal shock that occurred in Switzerland in 2011. Using a difference-in-differences 
specification, we compare the payout and investment policy of firms being affected by the 
reform with those of firms that are not. The quasi-experimental nature of this fiscal reform 
offers a unique setup to test whether the tax cut causally affects firms’ financial decisions.  
The empirical evidence on the effect of dividend tax cuts on firms’ payout policy is mixed. 
Poterba (2004) reports a strong positive long-run (but no short-run) elasticity of dividends with 
respect to the tax burden on dividends. Chetty and Saez (2005) show that the enactment of the 
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 significantly led publicly traded 
corporations to increase their dividends right after the tax cut. However, Brown, Liang and 
Weisbenner (2007) show that share repurchases went down at the same time, which left total 
payout unaffected by the tax cut. Differently, Hubbard and Michaely (1997) show that investors 
seem to ignore taxation when pricing a stock paying a cash dividend (heavily taxed) and a clone 
stock paying a stock dividend (lightly taxed). Furthermore, Brav, Graham, Harvey and 
Michaely (2008) indicate that more than two-thirds of US executives stated that the 2003 
dividend tax reduction would definitely or probably not affect their dividend decisions. 
Recently, Jacob and Michaely (2017) show that conflicting objectives between owners and 
managers dampen the sensitivity of payout policy to dividend taxation. 
The question of the effect of dividend taxes on investment also remains unsettled. Using 
data on dividends and capital gain taxes from 25 countries, Becker, Jacob and Jacob (2013) 
find that, after dividend tax cuts, firms with limited internal equity increase their investment 
relative to firms with plenty of internal equity. On the other hand, Yagan (2015) finds that the 
2003 US dividend tax cut had no impact on firms’ investment over the subsequent five years. 
Evidence from Sweden provided by Alstadsæter, Jacob and Michaely (2017) lie between these 
two views: they show that aggregate dividends did not increase following the local tax cut of 
2006 but that cash-constrained firms did increase external equity and investment more relative 
to cash-rich firms. 
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We believe we are in an ideal position to contribute to this important debate. Indeed, the 
Swiss tax reform studied in this paper has several desirable characteristics that allow us to avoid 
common problems that arise when estimating the effects of tax changes on payout and 
investment: 
- The tax cut affected some, but not all, firms incorporated in Switzerland. As we explain 
below, only firms with a certain type of reserves were allowed to pay tax-exempted 
dividends (hereafter TED) to their shareholders. As a result, we make use of a sample of 
control firms to filter out the effects of the business cycle on firms’ payout and investment 
policy. Without such a control, it remains challenging to draw any causal inference between 
a tax change and observed outcomes (Chetty and Saez, 2005).  
- The tax cut was unexpected – While initially targeting small and medium-sized enterprises, 
the 2011 fiscal reform also had some important unintended consequences on public firms. 
In particular, it allows some of them to pay TED.1  
- The tax cut was sudden – Firms only had a few months to benefit from the tax cut in 2011 
and several eligible firms were forced to wait until 2012 to benefit from it.2 As a result, 
Swiss companies were unable to anticipate the shock. 
- The tax cut was massive – As the maximum marginal tax rate dropped from 36.2% to zero, 
this is the most important dividend tax cut we are aware of. Thus, the incentives implied 
by this reform are economically important.3 
- The tax cut was permanent – The Swiss tax cut of 2011 was always presented as being 
permanent, unlike for instance the US tax cut of 2003 that carried a default expiration date 
after a few years.4  
- The overall reform includes no concurrent changes to the income tax or capital gains tax, 
and no other tax advantages on investments – Such concurrent changes would be a threat 
to the internal validity of the empirical design. 
                                                 
1 The fact that public companies could pay TED came as a surprise and was never mentioned in the debates prior 
to the enforcement of the fiscal reform. 
2 As discussed below, the fact that some eligible firms had to wait for one more year to benefit from the reform is 
going to strengthen the identification strategy. 
3 As a mean of comparison, the top marginal federal dividend income tax rate went from 38.6% to 15% in the 
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003. As a result, one may wonder whether the investment 
inelasticity reported by Yagan (2015) may be due to too low an initial fiscal shock. 
4 As of today (November 2018), Swiss companies can still pay tax-exempt dividends and some firms have done 
so every year since 2011. 
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Given the key role played by the equity channel in the relationship between dividend taxes and 
investment, we focus in this paper on public firms, which turns out to be an advantage. Indeed, 
unlike private firms, public firms enjoy a direct access to equity markets.5 Furthermore, for 
private firms, dividends are just one component of the total compensation of shareholders as 
the latter are also often involved in the management of the firms and receive compensations.6 
The actual breakdown between dividends and compensation mainly depends on the relative tax 
rates between the two types of payments. Fortunately, we do not have to worry about such 
substitution when dealing with public firms. 
Our empirical analysis proceeds in three main steps and leads to the following findings. 
First, we study the impact of the tax cut on the payout policy of firms. By contrasting treated 
and control firms, both graphically and using regressions, we document that the reaction to the 
shock was immediate and both statistically and economically large. We find consistent results 
by considering various dimensions of the payout policy: dividend yield, dividend payout, total 
payout, as well as the percentage of firms paying dividends. Our findings remain robust when 
we shorten the sample period or change the composition of our sample by removing some firms 
(e.g. large ones, small ones, and financials). In an auxiliary test, we also contrast treated firms 
with others that, although being theoretically eligible, had to wait until 2012 before their 
eligibility was recognized by the Swiss Fiscal Authority. This group of firms constitutes an 
ideal control sample as they are similar to the firms treated in 2011 - they were just late by one 
year. We find consistent results in this alternative setting. 
Second, we measure the real effects of the tax cut on firms’ investments. Overall, we find 
no difference between the investment policies of treated and control firms in our sample. Not 
only we extend the conclusion of Yagan (2015) to public firms, but we also aim to identify the 
channel at play. We show that the absence of real effects can be attributed to a significant drop 
in retained earnings, which is caused by the increase in the total payout of treated firms. Indeed, 
we find that the rise in dividends is not compensated by an equally sized drop in share 
repurchases. Furthermore, treated firms do not raise enough capital, through seasoned equity 
offerings, to compensate for the contraction in retained earnings. We also show that the 
reduction in retained earnings is not compensated by a reduction in cash holdings. At least one 
                                                 
5 Lack of access to equity financing is particularly problematic for the S-corps studied by Yagan (2015) as they 
are prevented by law from having any institutional equity financing and from having more than 100 shareholders. 
Other recent papers studying the effects of dividend tax cuts on private firms’ financial decisions include Jacob 
and Michaely (2017) and  Berzins, Bøhren and Stacescu (2018). 
6 For instance in Norway, 73% of the CEOs of the private firms studied by Berzins, Bøhren and Stacescu (2018) 
are members of the controlling family. 
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of the two channels (equity and cash) has to be at play to generate the positive impact on 
investment that is typically promised by the politicians implementing such fiscal reforms. 
Third, we show that reducing dividend taxes also has non-trivial implications for agency 
problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). We find that the treated firms that are the most exposed 
to agency concerns, as they have no monitoring blockholders and use dual-class share structure 
or voting right restrictions, are the most reactive to the tax cut. As they strongly and 
permanently reduce retained earnings after the tax cut, managers will end up with fewer 
resources to spend on wasteful projects. As a result, while politicians typically justify dividend 
tax cuts by promises of increased investment, consumption, and economic growth, our 
evidence suggests that the main advantage of tax cuts for society may lie somewhere else: they 
mitigate agency problems within firms. 
Our main contribution to the literature is to identify and exploit a unique set-up allowing us 
to provide a more clear-cut answer to the important, and so far unsettled, question of the effects 
of dividend taxes on firms’ payout and investment policy. We believe our identification 
strategy to be as close as it gets from a proper controlled experiment, which allows us to make 
causal statements about the financial and real effects of corporate taxes. Furthermore, our study 
is to the best of our knowledge, the first empirical study on the effects of a dividend tax cut on 
public firms using a control sample of unaffected, yet similar, firms.7 A final contribution is to 
document empirically a channel between dividend taxes and agency costs within public firms. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we derive our testable hypotheses 
from standard corporate finance theories. We present in Section 3 the Swiss corporate tax 
system and the fiscal shock we focus on. We describe our data in Section 4. Section 5 presents 
the effects of the dividend tax cut on the payout and investment policy of Swiss companies and 
Section 6 discusses the implication of the tax cut for agency problems. Finally, Section 7 
concludes our study. 
 
2 THEORY AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
The neoclassic theory of corporate dividend taxation, known as the “old view”, states that 
reducing dividend taxes mechanically reduces the firms’ cost of equity and boosts investment 
(Harberger, 1962, 1966; Feldstein, 1970; Poterba and Summers, 1985; Poterba, 2004). In this 
                                                 
7 Chetty and Saez (2005) also study public firms but their “control sample” was made of treated firms which, 
given their ownership structure, were supposed to be less affected by the tax cut. 
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theory, the marginal source of funds for investment is the new shares issued. Reducing the tax 
rates on dividends lowers the required rate of the return of shareholders, which is the cost of 
equity of the firm. This drop in the cost of equity mechanically turns the Net Present Value 
(NPV) of some investment projects from negative to positive, hence boosting capital 
expenditures. Such an increase in investment is funded by raising new equity, typically through 
seasoned equity offerings. 
According to this theory, dividend payout is not supposed to react to a tax cut in the short-
run but it should increase with time, once the positive effects of the new investments have 
materialized. Firms may, however, decide to immediately increase their dividend to signal that 
their earnings are expected to increase in the future (Bernheim, 1991). Similarly, in the agency 
model of Chetty and Saez (2010), a dividend tax cut leads to an immediate increase in dividend 
payments because it increases the manager’s preference for dividends relative to unproductive 
investments, and especially so if the manager also owns equity. In order to test the 
aforementioned theories, we state our first hypothesis: 
H1: Dividend payout increases after a dividend tax cut.  
Other standard theories claim that H1 should not hold. For instance, the “new view” 
developed by King (1974), Auerbach (1979), Bradford (1981), and Auerbach (2002) concludes 
that dividend taxes should have no impact on dividends and investment. Under this view, even 
if the firm distributes all its earnings to its shareholders, it can still fund its positive NPV 
projects with cash and without having to issue new equity. The shareholders are indifferent 
between the distribution now and the distribution in the future because both shareholders and 
the corporation are assumed to invest at the same market rate. 
Furthermore, to study the impact of a dividend tax cut on retained earnings, and ultimately 
on investment, one also needs to take into account share repurchases. In general, a share 
repurchase offers an attractive alternative to cash dividends as the generated cash flows are 
taxed as capital gains, unlike dividends. Whenever dividends are taxed more heavily than 
capital gains, lowering the dividend tax rate should trigger a substitution between dividends (↑) 
and share repurchases (↓). In order to assess the net effect of the changes in cash dividends and 
share repurchases, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H2: Total payout increases after a dividend tax cut. 
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H2 corresponds to a situation where dividends are more reactive with respect to the tax cut 
than share repurchases. In other words, the positive change in dividends dominates the negative 
change in share repurchase. If reducing dividend taxes leads to a higher total payout, it also 
mechanically reduces the retained earnings (∆R < 0) available to fund new investments (Doidge 
and Dyck, 2015). In such a case, in order to be able to increase investment, firms must 
simultaneously raise equity (∆E > 0). This is the main channel in the neoclassical model of 
dividend taxes as the tax cut is supposed to mechanically reduce the cost of equity. 
Alternatively, the firm can use its cash holding (∆C < 0) to fund the new investments. We test 
the funding channel of the new investment using the following hypothesis: 
H3: Firms raise equity and/or decrease their cash holdings after a dividend tax cut. 
Even if ∆E > 0 and ∆C < 0, we still need to have ∆E + ǀ∆Cǀ > ǀ∆Rǀ for the firm to have the 
necessary financial resources to increase investment. In other words, the increase in equity, 
adjusted for cash, has to dominate in absolute value the drop in retained earnings. Hence, 
raising equity is not a sufficient condition to spur corporate investment. In order to test the net 
effect of a dividend tax cut on investment we formulate our final hypothesis: 
H4: Firm’s investment increases after a dividend tax cut. 
This last hypothesis is going to be central in our study as it allows us to contrast the two 
main theories of dividend and corporate taxes (old and new views), and test whether corporate 
tax shocks have any real effect on the economy. Before we formally test these four hypotheses, 
we provide some information about the Swiss tax system, the natural experiment we consider 
in this paper, and our data. We do so in the next two sections. 
 
3 CORPORATE TAXES IN SWITZERLAND AND THE NATURAL EXPERIMENT  
3.1 The Swiss corporate tax system 
This section describes the tax treatment of dividends, share repurchases, and capital gains 
for the various types of shareholders in Switzerland. There are two main features of the Swiss 
corporate tax system that one needs to be aware of. First, whenever a Swiss corporation pays 
dividends to its shareholders (domestic and foreign), it has to directly pay a withholding tax to 
the fiscal authorities that corresponds to 35% of the amount of dividends, i.e., investors only 
receive 65% of the gross dividend. They then have to claim back the withholding tax once they 
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have declared and paid taxes on their income.8 Second, taxes must be paid at the municipal, 
cantonal (state), and Federal levels and, consequently, the overall fiscal burden depends on the 
domicile of the fiscal subject. This multi-layer system is similar to the US tax system in which 
individuals not only have to pay Federal taxes but in most cases also state and municipal taxes 
on income and dividends.  
In Switzerland, taxes on dividends depend on the fiscal status of the shareholder who 
receives them. There are four different types. The first three correspond to categories of 
domestic investors whereas the last one applies to investors who do not have their legal 
domicile in Switzerland. 
- Individual investors: Dividends are taxed as ordinary income while capital gains are not 
taxed.9 The top marginal personal income tax rate was 36.3% for this category of 
investors.10 
- Corporations: Dividends on stocks held by corporations are taxed as ordinary corporate 
income. Capital gains are taxed at the same rate, i.e., 21.2%.11 If a company holds more 
than 20% of the equity of another company, it benefits from a tax reduction on dividends. 
- Tax-exempted investors: Institutional investors, such as pension funds and investment 
funds, do not pay taxes on dividends and capital gains. Other tax-exempted shareholders 
include government organizations at any level (Federal, cantonal or municipal), charitable 
organizations, and international organizations. 
- Foreign investors: Dividends distributed to foreign investors are subject to the 35% 
withholding tax. Foreign investors can then reclaim this tax if they declare these revenues 
in their home country and if their country has signed an agreement with Switzerland in 
order to avoid double taxation. 
As there are no taxes on capital gains in Switzerland, share repurchases appear a priori as a 
more tax-efficient way for a firm to transfer cash to shareholders. However, the tax treatment 
of share repurchases depends on the goal of the share repurchase program. On the one hand, if 
firms keep the repurchased shares as treasury stocks (to use them at a later date) then they are 
                                                 
8 The withholding tax system is not unique to the Swiss setting and can be found in the United States and in 23 
out of the 28 European Union member states. However, in contrast to most of these countries, the withholding tax 
in Switzerland is not limited to foreign entities but applies to all investors whether domestic or foreigners.  
9 There is an exception for individuals obtaining more revenues from trading securities than from their own labor 
income. Fiscal authorities treat these individuals as professional traders and impose capital gains as income. 
10 Source: OECD Tax database website. This rate is for an investor located in the city of Zurich for the year 2010. 
11 Source: OECD Tax database website. This rate is for a firm located in the city of Zurich for the year 2010. 
- 9 - 
 
taxed as capital gains and they are an attractive alternative to dividends. On the other hand, if 
companies repurchase shares in order to cancel them, the difference between the repurchase 
price and the nominal value of the stock is taxed at the same rate as a dividend.12  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
We see in Figure 1 that dividends are the dominant form of payout in Switzerland. Even if 
dividends are known to be sluggish at the firm level, aggregate dividends fluctuate according 
to the business cycles (see Panel A). For instance, the drop in the payout of Swiss companies 
between 2007 and 2009 corresponds to a period of weak economic conditions, and even to a 
period of negative GDP growth between 2008Q3 and 2009Q1. The impact of this recession 
was more severe on the investment of Swiss companies as the fixed gross capital formation 
dropped by CHF5 billion (-15%) over the same three quarters. The sensitivity of both payout 
and investments to business-cycle conditions reinforce the importance of having a control 
sample (as we do) when testing the effect of a fiscal shock on payout and investments. 
Otherwise, observed swings in dividends or investments could be wrongly attributed to the 
fiscal shock. We also see in Panel A that share repurchases account for an important part of 
aggregate payout of Swiss companies. When expressed as a percentage of aggregate dividends, 
repurchases also exhibit important significant time variation: from as high as 99.1% in 2003 to 
as low as 6.8% in 2013. 
Panel B shows that the fraction of firms paying dividends increased steadily until the great 
recession, with a maximum of 63% of the firms paying dividends in 2008. Then it dropped in 
2009-2010, and rebounded to pre-crisis levels after 2012. We notice that, while repurchases 
account for a significant fraction of total payout, it is not a widespread phenomenon across 
public firms in Switzerland. Indeed, on average, only 6.5% of Swiss corporations repurchase 
their shares in a given year. This contrasts with the behavior of publicly listed firms in the US. 
Over the same period, the proportion of US public firms repurchasing their stocks ranges 
between 30 and 40% (Farre-Mensa, Michaely and Schmalz, 2014). 
                                                 
12 Since the tax is not calculated on the difference between the repurchase price and the price paid by the investor 
to buy the share, this creates an important fiscal disadvantage for taxed investors. This is due to the fact that the 
nominal value is much lower than the current stock market price (on average less than 1%) and therefore the basis 
on which the tax burden is computed is much larger than just the capital gain (Chung, Isakov and Pérignon, 2007). 
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3.2 The Natural Experiment 
The possibility to pay TED in 2011 was an unintended consequence of the second Corporate 
Taxation Reform (CTR2) proposed by the Swiss Federal government.13 As stated by the 
Federal government, the main objective of this reform was to lower the tax burden on 
corporations to favor economic growth and stimulate employment. For instance, the Federal 
Council states that CTR2 “aims to improve the fiscal conditions for small and medium sized 
companies” and “to lower the fiscal burden that distort business decisions, and to boost 
economic growth and employment”. 
Specifically, the three main changes to the Swiss corporate tax system are: 
- To reduce the fiscal burden on firms’ capital, CTR2 introduces the capital contribution 
principle, which allows Swiss firms to exempt from withholding and income taxes the 
repayment of capital contributions made by the direct shareholders. This change aims to 
eliminate the particularly unfavorable tax treatment of exits by shareholders of small and 
medium-sized enterprises – hence hurting equity issuance in the first place. 
- To dampen the double taxation of corporate earnings, CTR2 exempts 40% of the dividend 
payed to any physical person or firm owning at least 10% of a given firm. Before CTR2, 
the threshold was at 20%. Such large equity stakes are a common feature among small and 
medium-sized enterprises.  
- To simplify the reorganization and transfer of small and medium-sized enterprises, CTR2 
fully exempts from taxes any cash flows coming from the sale of production factors, such 
as vehicles or pieces of equipment. It also improves the tax treatment on corporate transfers 
or liquidations. 
The CTR2 bill was approved by the Swiss Parliament on April 13, 2007 and eventually 
enforced on January 1, 2011.14 Prior to this date, the Swiss government always presented the 
capital contribution principle as applying only to small and medium-sized enterprises. 
However, on December 9, 2010, or 23 days prior to the enforcement date of CTR2, the Swiss 
Federal Tax Authority published a circular describing in great detail the conditions under which 
                                                 
13 The first Corporate Tax Reform (CTR1) took place in 1997, hence 10 years before the starting date of our 
sample period. The third Corporate Tax Reform (CTR3) has been accepted by the Swiss parliament in June 2016 
but it was eventually rejected in February 2017 by the Swiss people in a referendum. 
14 The entry into force of the new bill was postponed because a coalition of political parties launched a referendum 
against the new law on the ground that it would lead to substantial revenue losses for the Federal Government. 
Eventually, the Swiss people accepted the new law on February 24, 2008 with a short majority of 50.8%. 
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capital contributions could be tax-exempted. In this document, the Federal Tax Authority 
explicitly considered the case of paying tax-exempted dividends out of capital contribution, a 
case never mentioned in the preceding debates. Consequently, all firms incorporated in 
Switzerland that were able to prove the existence of capital contributions were allowed to 
distribute TED to their shareholders from their paid-in capital.15 A capital contribution is 
defined as the difference between the market price and the nominal value a shareholder pays. 
Such contributions are made either at the time of the Initial Public Offering, when new shares 
are issued, or when executives and employees exercise their stock options.16 
Since the possibility to pay tax-exempted dividends came as a surprise in December 2010, 
and the deadline to get the capital contributions approved by the Federal Tax Authority was 
very short, only a fraction of eligible companies could use this possibility in 2011.17 Actually, 
46% of all listed companies had some reserves from capital contributions recognized in 2011 
while an additional 20% had some reserves recognized in 2012. As a result, the introduction of 
the capital contribution principle in 2011 creates a natural experiment setting as the possibility 
to pay tax-free dividends was unexpected. We assign firms to the treatment group if they had 
recognized reserves from capital contribution in 2011 and were authorized to pay tax-
exempted dividends. Firms are in the control group if they did not have such reserves 
recognized by the Federal Tax Authority and hence could not pay TED in 2011. Moreover, the 
allocation of firms into one of the two groups appears to be quite exogenous as one cannot 
argue that firms increased their capital, made an Initial Public Offering or granted stock options 
on purpose since it was virtually impossible to predict the actual scope of this piece of 
legislation. 
The introduction of the tax-exemption of dividends sparked a heated political debate in the 
country. Several members of the Swiss Parliament tried to cancel the vote claiming that the 
government had not properly informed the citizens. In December 2011, the Swiss Supreme 
Court rejected the appeal and confirmed the new law but blamed the Federal Council for having 
improperly informed citizens before the vote.  
                                                 
15 The tax break for investors investigated in this paper applies to all Federal, cantonal, and municipal taxes. 
16 Only capital contributions from January 1, 1997 onwards were eligible for tax-free repayment from 2011 
onwards. Capital contributions had to be presented to the Federal Tax Authority at the latest 30 days after the 
approval of the 2011 fiscal year accounts. In order to do so companies had to go through their capital contributions 
for fiscal years 1997-2010, fill out a form to be sent to the Federal Tax Authority and justify their demand for the 
creation of a capital contribution account. 
17 Swiss companies are legally obliged to have their annual meeting at the latest six months after their fiscal year 
end. In our sample, 90.1% of the firms have their fiscal year-end on December 31 and must therefore hold their 
annual meeting before the end of the following June. 
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4 DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Our sample of firms includes all constituents of the broadest stock index in Switzerland, the 
Swiss Performance Index, between 2007 and 2015. On any given year, the index is made of 
around 200 firms traded on the SIX Swiss exchange. To be included in our sample, a firm has 
to be part of the index for at least one year. Consequently, we end up with an unbalanced panel 
of 264 companies, ranging from large, multi-billion multinationals (e.g. Nestlé, Novartis, UBS) 
to smaller, more local firms.18 Focusing on the major stock index’ constituents allows us to 
discard companies with a very low free float, open-end funds, or foreign firms that are cross-
listed in Switzerland. The latter would unlikely qualify as appropriate control firms in our 
empirical tests. 
While our analysis requires precise information on the tax status of the dividends for each 
firm/year, this information is typically not included in standard financial databases. We 
therefore hand-collected such information from the companies’ annual reports and 
systematically cross-checked it with the Swiss stock guide. 19 In particular, we collected the 
yearly dividend paid per share as well as its tax status: taxed or tax-exempted.20  
We also collected detailed data on the share repurchase activities of all sample firms from 
the Swiss Takeover Board (http://www.takeover.ch), which is the supervisory authority 
overseeing repurchase activities in Switzerland. Data on the length of the program and 
repurchase methods were also collected from the Swiss Takeover Board website. The actual 
amounts repurchased by firms were obtained from the firms' websites/annual reports, and the 
website of the Swiss stock exchange (www.six-swiss-exchange.com). 
Furthermore, all accounting data for our sample firms were obtained from Worldscope. An 
exception is the reserves from capital contribution giving the right to pay TED, which had to 
be hand collected from the firms’ annual reports. Moreover, stock price data were obtained 
from Datastream. 
                                                 
18 When studying investment (capex) and financing options, we exclude financial firms from the sample. 
Differently, in our tests on payout, we estimate the specifications with all firms and with non-financial firms only. 
We believe including financial firms can be interesting in our setting as all financial firms in Switzerland, 
including state-owned banks, can freely choose their dividend policy.  
19 The Swiss stock guide is an annual publication presenting for all Swiss public firms a large number of financial 
information in a standardized format. 
20 Swiss firms pay dividends once a year. 
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Finally, we collected ownership data from the firms’ annual reports. For each firm, we have 
data on the identity and holdings of all shareholders having more than 3% of voting rights. We 
then classify firms in different categories. A firm is said to be widely held if it does not have a 
shareholder holding more than 10% of the voting rights. If the largest shareholder of a company 
has more than 10% of voting rights, the firm is considered to be owned by a controlling 
shareholder. For 63% of these firms, the blockholder is a family whereas for the remaining 
37%, the blockholder is either the State, another corporation, a pension fund, or a foundation. 
We report in Table 1 some summary statistics about all sample firms in the year preceding 
the enactment of the reform (2010). All firm characteristics and investment variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In our sample, around 70% of the firms pay a cash 
dividend to their shareholders and the average dividend yield is 2.03%. On average, a typical 
firm pays out 34.78% of its earnings in dividends, and 36.31% in dividends and/or share 
repurchases.21  
When splitting our sample between treated and control firms, we end up with two groups 
that are well balanced in terms of size (114 vs. 96 firms) and remarkably similar in terms of 
composition. Indeed, treated and control firms look very much alike as far as payout, firm 
characteristics, investment, and ownership are concerned. For instance, the dividend yield is 
2.07% for treated firms vs. 1.99% for control firms, and the total payout is 37.19% for treated 
firms vs. 35.58% for control firms. Moreover, prior to the reform, 67.71% of the treated firms 
were paying dividends vs. 70.18% of the control firms. As for investment, the capex-to-PPE 
(Property, Plant & Equipment) ratio is 20.68% for treated firms vs. 17.35% for control firms, 
and the cash-to-total-assets ratio is 17% for treated firms vs. 16.5% for control firms. For all 
considered variables, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that treated and control firms have 
the same mean. 
There are two dimensions though for which the two subsamples differ. The first one is size, 
as measured either by total assets or book value of equity, for which treated firms appear to 
outsize their peers. This is due to the fact that the size distribution of Swiss companies is skewed 
and that the largest ones tend to be treated.22 The second one is the fraction of firms that are 
                                                 
21 Following Julio and Ikenberry (2004) and Von Eije and Megginson (2008), payout ratios are set to 100% if they 
are negative or if a firm distributes more than 100% of its earnings. 
22 If we proxy firm size by market capitalization instead of total assets, treated firms are not larger than control 
firms anymore. This is due to the fact that the market capitalization of the largest Swiss banks was very low 
compared to their book value of equity.  
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widely-held as this feature is more common among treated firms: 40.43% vs. 28.07% for 
control firms. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
5 EFFECTS ON PAYOUT POLICY AND INVESTMENT 
5.1. Payout Policy 
We start our investigation on the effect of removing dividend taxes by comparing the 
evolution of the main payout variables for firms affected by the reform (treated firms) and those 
that are not (control firms). As explained in Section 3, to be treated, a firm must have some 
reserves from capital contributions that have been recognized by the fiscal authorities in 2011. 
On the other hand, control firms do not benefit from the dividend tax cut and can only pay 
taxed dividends to their shareholders. This setting allows us to cleanly assess the impact of 
removing the dividend tax on firms’ financial decisions.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Figure 2 displays the evolution of the average dividend yield, average dividend payout, and 
of the fraction of dividend-paying firms, using the following definitions: 
dividend per sharedividend yield
stock price
= itit
it
 
dividend per sharedividend payout
earnings per share
= itit
it
  
# of dividend paying firms% of dividend paying firms  = 
# of sample firms
t
t
t
  
 
The evidence in Figure 2 is remarkable. Indeed, before the introduction of CTR2, both 
control and treated firms behave similarly. On the first year of the reform (2011), treated firms 
sharply increase their dividend yield while it remains quite stable for control firms. The 
economic magnitude of the effect appears large. Interestingly, we obtain consistent results 
when looking at the other two dimensions of the firms’ dividend payout. Furthermore, the 
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evolution of the curves after the tax cut also suggests that the effect seems to be fairly persistent 
over time. We complement our analysis by analyzing total payout, which we define as: 
 
dividend per share amount per share spent for repurchasestotal payout
earnings per share
+
= it itit
it
 
 
Accounting for share repurchases allows us to have a full picture of the payout policy of the 
firms. We also display the evolution of this additional variable in Figure 2 and see that going 
from dividend payout to total payout does not materially affect the overall pattern. The payout 
ratio of treated and control firms follows a common trend prior to the reform and their evolution 
diverges significantly afterwards.23 
We then formally contrast the payout policy of treated and control firms using a difference-
in-differences setting. We estimate the following specification using OLS regressions and 
robust standard errors clustered at the industry level: 
 
 α β ′= + ⋅ + + + +it it it i t ity treated FE FE eγ X  (1) 
 
where yit is a payout variable, treatedit is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm 
is treated and the year is equal or after 2011, Xit is a vector of control variables, and FEi and 
FEt  are firm and year fixed effects. 
Such a specification appears particularly appropriate in our setting as the payout variables 
of treated and control firms follow a common trend prior to the fiscal shock (see the 2007-2010 
subperiod in Figure 2). Estimation results in Table 2 indicate that treated firms tend to increase 
dividend and total payout following the fiscal shock (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7). The beta 
coefficient is both statistically significant at the 99% confidence level and economically 
significant. It means that treated firms increase their dividend yield after the tax cut by 0.672% 
more than control firms. This is a sizable increase as the unconditional average of the dividend 
yield is around 2% over our sample period. When turning to the three other payout variables, 
                                                 
23 For completeness, we also study other payout variables considered in the literature (see Chetty and Saez, 2005): 
the percentage of firms starting to pay a dividend (first timers) and the percentage of firms increasing their 
dividends compared to the previous year. Both variables are significantly higher for treated firms in 2011 but are 
comparable in magnitude over the 2012-2015 period. Note that the effect is not expected to be permanent for these 
variables as a given firm cannot, by definition, initiate dividend payment two years in a row, and the second 
variable is in first-difference and not in level. 
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the pattern remains very similar: the payout ratios and the propensity to pay a dividend increase 
significantly more for treated firms after the tax cut. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
In order to reinforce the causal explanation between the tax cut and payout policy, and to 
better understand the dynamics of the payout policy around the fiscal shock, we estimate an 
alternative specification in which we treat each year separately:  
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 0 1
2
1 0 1
2
α β β β
β
−= + ⋅ − + ⋅ + ⋅ +
′+ ⋅ + + + + +
it it it it
it it i t it
y treated treated treated
treated FE FE eγ X
 (2) 
where treatedit (-1) is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm is treated and the 
year is 2010, treatedit (0) is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm is treated and 
the year is 2011, treatedit (+1) is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm is treated 
and the year is 2012, and treatedit (2+) is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm 
is treated and the year is 2013, 2014, or 2015. 
Such a specification allows us to get a better sense of the gradual adjustment of the payout 
policy of the firms and to test whether the effect is persistent. It also allows to detect, or rule 
out, any potential anticipation effect. The results in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 of Table 2 clearly 
show that most of the increase occurs on the first year of the reform (year 0), which is consistent 
with the visual analysis of Figure 2. The non-significant 𝛽𝛽−1 coefficients indicate that there is 
no anticipation, which points toward a causal explanation. Moreover, both the estimated values 
and t-stats of the 𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2+ coefficients collectively indicate that the effect of the tax cut on 
dividends is not short-lived.  
We conduct a series of additional tests and robustness checks. A first potential source of 
concern is the fact that some control firms did react to the fiscal shock during the post-reform 
period. Indeed, some firms started building reserves from capital contributions to be able to 
pay some TED to their shareholders. To take care of this concern, we drop these “switching 
firms” from the analysis and re-estimate both equations (1) and (2). Doing so leads to a 
reduction in the number of observations from 1,857 to 1,680, but it does not materially change 
the overall pattern. We see in Table 3 that the coefficient associated to the treatment variable 
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remains positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level (columns 1, 3, 5 and 
7), and the estimated dynamics remains virtually unaffected (columns 2, 4, 6 and 8). 
An alternative way to deal with switching firms is to terminate the sample period at the end 
of year 0. Doing so allows us to design a particularly clean test of the effect of removing 
dividend taxes on firm payout, but it comes at the cost of reducing both sample size and 
statistical power. We present the estimation results in columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 of Table 4. The 
estimated beta coefficients remain statistically significant at the 90% or 95% confidence levels 
for the first three variables (columns 1, 3 and 5), but their values are smaller than when we 
consider the full five years after the tax cut. The latter is consistent with the fact that the effect 
was building up over the three years following the event. For the percentage of payers, the 𝛽𝛽 
coefficient on the treatment dummy remains positive and statistically significant at the 90% 
confidence level. However, in this case, there is no drop in the value of the coefficient 
compared to Table 3 as the full adjustment is made after one year. 
 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 here] 
 
In an auxiliary test, we exploit a specific feature of our set-up. Indeed, firms had little time 
between the announcement of the possibility to pay TED (December 2010) and their next 
general assembly (typically between March and May 2011). Indeed, some firms with potential 
reserves from capital contributions did not have enough time to file their request with the 
Federal Tax Authority and to get its approval in due time. As a result, such firms, although 
being theoretically eligible, had to wait an extra year to benefit from the tax cut. From an 
identification point of view, these “late firms” constitute an ideal control sample as they are 
similar to the firms treated in 2011. Our setting looks, in some respects, like the one used by 
Bernstein (2015) in his study of the effects of going public on firms’ innovation. He contrasts 
long-run innovation firms that filed to go public in the same year, but experienced different 
post-filing stock market returns. Just like in the present test, these two groups of firms are ex 
ante similar and offer a clear identification strategy. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 in Table 4 display 
the regression results for treated firms vs. late firms over the sample period 2007-2011. In this 
case too, we find that firms quickly and massively adjusted their payout policy after the tax 
cut. 
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As an additional robustness check, we remove all firms belonging to the financial industry. 
This reduces our sample size from 1,857 to 1,336 observations. We estimate equations (1) and 
(2) with non-financial firms only and report the results in Table 5. Regardless of the payout 
variable, we obtain consistent results, which suggests the base line results are not materially 
affected by the presence of financial firms.24  
Finally, as our sample is very heterogeneous in terms of size with some small local 
companies and multinational firms, we redo our tests after removing the bottom and top quintile 
of firms in terms of total assets. Results in Table A3 (in the Appendix) indicates that our 
findings are not driven by the smallest or the largest firms.  
Overall, the evidence presented above hints at a strong impact of dividend taxes on the 
payout policy of firms, which comes in contrast with the often alleged minor effect of corporate 
taxes (Myers, McConnell, Peterson, Roebuck, Soter, Stewart and Stern, 1998). More 
specifically, we cannot reject the first two hypotheses (H1 and H2) according to which a 
dividend tax cut increases both dividend payout and total payout. This empirical evidence is 
consistent with previous evidence for private firms (Yagan, 2015; Alstadsæter, Jacob and 
Michaely, 2017; Jacob and Michaely, 2017). Hence, our findings contradict both the neoclassic 
and new view of dividend taxes according to which payout policy is independent of dividend 
taxes. It is then more in line with theories that imply that reducing dividend taxes lead firms to 
immediately increase dividends, such as the signaling model of (Bernheim, 1991) or the agency 
model of Chetty and Saez (2010). 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
5.2. Investment Policy 
We now analyze whether the introduction of CTR2 had any effect on the investment policy 
of Swiss companies (Hypothesis H4). Our measure of corporate investment is the ratio of 
capital expenditures scaled by lagged fixed assets (property, plant and equipment). This ratio 
is widely used in the empirical corporate finance literature (e.g. Almeida and Campello (2007) 
or Foucault and Fresard (2014)) to represent firm investment levels. As with the payout 
variables in Section 5.1, we start by plotting the evolution of the capex-to-PPE ratio. We 
observe in Figure 3 that prior to the reform, the evolution of this investment variable was 
                                                 
24 In Tables A1 and A2, we replicate Tables 3 and 4 using non-financial firms only and obtain similar results. 
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remarkably similar for both treated and control firms. Unlike for payout, we visually do not 
detect any increase in average investment for the treated firms after the enactment of the reform. 
If anything, the average investment is increasing only for control firms 2-3 years after the tax 
cut. Differently, for treated firms, the negative trends initiated after the 2008 crisis continues 
after the introduction of CTR2. 
Next, we estimate Equation (1) using the natural logarithm of capex and the ratio of capex-
to-PPE as the endogenous variable. For each variable, we estimate the four specifications that 
we used for the payout variables in Section 5.1. Specifically, we contrast treated and control 
firms over the whole sample (columns 1 and 5), treated and control firms, except “switching 
firms”, over the whole sample (columns 2 and 6), contrast treated and control firms over 2007-
2011 (columns 3 and 7), contrast treated firms with “late firms” over the 2007-2011 (columns 
4 and 8). We report the regression results in Table 6.25 Overall, we do not detect any significant 
effects of the tax cut on the investment of treated firms. This set of results indicate that the 
CTR2 did not meet one of its main objective, which was to produce positive real effects.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 and Table 6 here] 
 
Our results are in line with Yagan (2015) who reports that the 2003 dividend tax cut had no 
material effect on the investment policy of private firms in the US. This body of evidence 
clearly contradicts neoclassical models which focus on the role of equity and on its reduced 
cost following any tax cut. In order to better understand why reduced taxes on dividends did 
not materialize into more investment, we test (1) whether treated firms raise equity and/or (2) 
whether they reduce their cash holdings more than control firms. We display in Figure 3 the 
percentage of firms that increase their equity (book value) on a given year. In this figure, there 
is no indication that treated firms are more prone to raise equity than their peers after the tax 
cut.  
We complement this visual analysis using a series of regression analyses. The estimation 
results in Table 7 confirm that treated firms do not significantly increase their equity and do 
not significantly reduce their cash holdings.26 Given the fact that, at the same time, we also 
                                                 
25 In Table A4, we re-estimate our specifications on investment using different winsorizing thresholds and obtain 
similar results. 
26 In Table A5, we re-estimate our specifications on equity and cash using different winsorizing thresholds and 
obtain similar results. 
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report a sudden and large increase in total payout, the residual financial resources available to 
finance new investment is mechanically shrinking. 
 
 [Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Overall, our findings in this section allow us to reject both Hypotheses H3 and H4 and 
provide the following message. Reducing the dividend tax has two main impacts: First, it 
lowers the cost of equity for treated firms, which tend to increase their investment. Second, it 
increases total payout or, in other words, reduces retained earnings available to engage in new 
investments. The net effect of these two opposite forces is unknown a priori and becomes an 
empirical question. In our setting, we conclude that none of the two effects really dominates 
the other one, and the net effect is null or very small. 
  
6 IMPLICATIONS FOR AGENCY PROBLEMS 
We have seen in the previous sections that reducing dividend taxes induces firms to 
significantly increase their dividend payout. But because dividends remove corporate wealth 
from insider control, changing dividend taxes should also impact the level of agency problems 
(Jensen, 1986). In this section, we illustrate empirically this phenomenon, which can be seen 
as an unintended consequence of the dividend tax cut. In particular, we see that the reduction 
in available retained earnings is strongest for firms that are most exposed to agency problems. 
The question of whether dividend taxes affect agency problems appears particularly 
interesting in our setting. In terms of corporate governance, Switzerland belongs to the 
German-origin civil law countries which tend to have poor investor protection (La Porta, Lopez 
de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). This is illustrated by Switzerland ranking quite low in 
terms of the anti-director rights index (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998), 
anti-self-dealing index (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008), or corporate 
governance ratings (Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2007; Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira and Matos, 
2011).  
Different types of agency problems can arise in our setting. In widely held firms, there is a 
conflict of interest between shareholders and management as the shareholders do not have the 
capacity and incentive to properly monitor the managers. Managers may potentially exert 
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insufficient effort, engage in wasteful investment, pay themselves compensation and enjoy 
various perks, which eventually destroy firm value. Differently, in firms having a controlling 
shareholder, agency problems materialize through a conflict of interest between majority and 
minority shareholders. Agency problems are less severe in those firms as a large shareholder 
has strong incentives to closely monitor the management team (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 2000). 
Nevertheless, the controlling shareholder can potentially extract private benefits from 
outside shareholders. In addition to ownership structure, differences in the severity of agency 
problems can also be related to the use of control-enhancing mechanisms (CEM). Swiss firms 
mainly use two such mechanisms: multiple share classes and voting right restrictions. The 
former allows the controlling shareholder to have more control rights than cash-flow rights and 
the latter represents an anti-takeover mechanisms (in practice, the limit is set between 2 and 
10%). Both mechanisms aim to limit shareholder democracy and give more power to the 
controlling shareholder and/or the management of the firm. The use of CEM leaves more 
freedom to insiders and is potentially associated with more agency problems. Note that 39% of 
firms in our sample have one of these two kinds of CEM. Our tests exploit the cross-sectional 
variations in the level of agency problems proxied by ownership concentration or the use of 
CEM. 
We start by contrasting the reaction to the tax cut of two types of treated firms: those that 
are widely-held (19.2% of the sample) and those which have one or several blockholders 
(80.8% of the sample). We estimate a variation of Equation (1) in which we break the treated 
variable down into two variables: one that takes a value of one if the treated firm is widely-
held and another one that takes a value of one if the treated firm has a blockholder.27 We see 
in Table 8 that the value of the beta coefficients on the treatment variables is positive and 
statistically significant for both types of firms, which suggests that the effect documented in 
Section 5 is widespread among all types of public firms. However, the value of the beta 
coefficient is much higher for widely-held firms. For instance, when modelling dividend yields 
in column 1, the beta coefficient is 66% higher for widely-held firms than for firms with a 
blockholder. We obtain consistent results when using dividend and payout ratios and the 
percentage of dividend payers (columns 3, 5 and 7) for which the difference in betas are 
respectively equal to 57%, 51%, and 251%. This first set of results indicates that firms 
                                                 
27 We define blockholders using a 10% threshold but we consider other thresholds in our robustness checks. 
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associated with higher agency costs (i.e., widely-held firms) increase their payout significantly 
more than firms associated with lower agency costs (i.e., firms with a blockholder). 
The results are presented in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 of Table 8. For widely-held firms, we 
observe that CEM are associated with a stronger reaction to the tax cut. We see in Table 8 that, 
for three out of the four payout variables, the beta coefficient is indeed higher for firms with 
CEM. This suggests that the firms that are more prone to severe agency problems, namely those 
without any blockholder and with control enhancing structures in place, are the ones that 
increase the most their payout. By doing so, they decrease the available retained earnings the 
most and therefore leave less room for agency problems to materialize. These findings are 
consistent with results in Berzins, Bøhren and Stacescu (2018) for private Norwegian firms. 
When turning to firms with blockholders, the situation is opposite. The beta coefficient is 
only significant for firms associated with lower agency costs (i.e., firms with a blockholder and 
no CEM). Differently, firms that have both a blockholder and some CEM in place do not 
significantly change their payout policy after the tax reduction. Our interpretation of this result 
is that these blockholders have the full control over the firm as they have the absolute majority 
of voting rights. After the tax cut, these firms do not increase payout and keep the level of 
retained earnings constant, which might be detrimental to outside shareholders. 
 [Insert Figure 4 and Table 8 here] 
7 CONCLUSION 
The distortive effect of corporate taxes is a fundamental problem in both corporate and 
public finance. In this paper, we contribute to the important debate on the impact of dividend 
taxes on corporate decisions by focusing on the 2011 corporate tax reform in Switzerland. This 
reform gives us a quasi-experimental set-up as some firms were suddenly able to pay tax-
exempted dividends while others were not. 
The main findings from our study are the following. We find that treated firms immediately 
and massively increased payouts after the tax cut. Because the rise in dividends is not 
compensated by an equally sized drop in share repurchases, the total payout also significantly 
increased after the tax cut, or in other words, retained earnings significantly decreased. When 
turning to corporate investment, we report a zero-elasticity with respect to dividend taxes. We 
show that this comes from the fact that treated firms do not raise enough equity to compensate 
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for the contraction in retained earnings. Taken together, our findings suggest that (1) 
corporations do care about the taxes faced by its shareholders, (2) dividend taxes materially 
distort financial decisions of firms as they force corporations to retain too large a fraction of 
earnings, and (3) dividend tax cuts do not seem to boost investment but can alleviate agency 
problems. 
More than 10 years after the second Corporate Taxation Reform was passed by the Swiss 
Parliament, tax-exempt dividends is still a prominent way for firms to return cash to their 
shareholders, and it is likely to remain the case for the years to come. Indeed, the latest figures 
for the year 2017 indicate that current reserves from capital contributions (required to pay tax-
exempt dividends) amount CHF1,955 Bio for all Swiss corporations, almost three times the 
Swiss GDP. Many large public firms replenished these reserves to record levels and will be 
able to pay years of tax-exempt dividends: 29 years of dividends for Credit Suisse, 19 years for 
Lonza, 14 years for Lafarge Holcim, and 13 years for UBS. 
To conclude, it is interesting to notice that the fiscal reform investigated in this paper took 
place in a country with a particularly large financial sector. Following the Global Financial 
Crisis, Swiss banks, like their international peers, had to significantly increase their regulatory 
capital and it was costly for them to do so. Ironically, in Switzerland, we see in this paper that 
this cost was greatly mitigated by the fact that domestic banks were allowed to use this extra 
capital to pay tax-exempt dividends to their shareholders. While the question of whether 
reduced taxes can be an efficient way to reduce the burden of banking regulation is beyond the 
scope of this paper, it should warrant further investigation. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics  
 
This table presents descriptive statistics on corporate data for the year 2010 for all sample companies, control companies and treated companies. The last two columns describe 
differences of means between the treated and control group and the associated p-values. Dividends shows four variables related to dividend payments, Firm characteristics 
different accounting variables, Investments capex, PPE and their ratio and finally Ownership & Agency gives a brief overview of the ownership structure and the use of control-
enhancing mechanisms of companies. To be considered a blockholder, a family or non-family blockholder company, the largest shareholder must hold at least 10% of voting 
rights in a company otherwise the company is denoted as widely-held. Control-enhancing mechanisms denotes companies either having multiple share classes or voting right 
restrictions. 
Nb of obs. Mean Median Nb of obs. Mean Median Nb of obs. Mean Median Difference p-value
Dividends
Dividend yield 210 2.03 2.00 114 1.99 2.00 96 2.07 2.00 -0.08 0.77           
Dividend pay-out 210 34.78 30.50 114 33.97 28.50 96 35.73 33.00 -1.76 0.70           
Total pay-out 210 36.31 32.00 114 35.58 30.50 96 37.19 34.50 -1.61 0.72           
% payers 210 69.05 100.00 114 70.18 100.00 96 67.71 100.00 2.47 0.70           
Firm characteristics
Cash & equiv. 210 1064770 97802 114 914321 77670 96 1243428 124042 -329107 0.52           
Total assets 210 14100000 829002 114 9159766 708803 96 20100000 973600 -10901275 0.18           
BV of equity 210 2187605 348179 114 1832240 285760 96 2609600 464618 -777359 0.40           
MV of equity 210 4643861 585414 114 4768620 405431 96 4495709 738332 272911 0.91           
EBIT 203 527648 40297 108 545545 37574 95 507303 61266 38241 0.88           
Net Income 210 312076 22028 114 345922 22169 96 271885 20960 74037 0.65           
Age 210 76.60 62.00 114 80.96 71.00 96 71.42 58.00 9.55 0.29           
Cash& equiv / total assets 210 16.75 11.12 114 16.54 10.12 96 17.00 12.71 -0.46 0.85           
ROA 203 2.37 3.79 108 2.32 3.77 95 2.43 3.79 -0.11 0.95           
ROE 210 2.36 7.92 114 2.25 8.75 96 2.49 7.32 -0.24 0.95           
Leverage 210 33.96 31.04 114 35.35 31.16 96 32.30 29.94 3.05 0.42           
Nb. Employees 189 7551 1328 98 6849 1062 91 8306 1808 -1457 0.59           
Salaries 199 674058 101308 110 606895 86548 89 757068 133700 -150172 0.62           
Investments
Capex 202 134242 20940 108 121262 15021 94 149155 27712 -27893 0.64           
PPE 204 820677 142951 108 763580 128550 96 884910 160036 -121331 0.72           
Capex / PPE 198 29.25 15.02 106 30.72 13.70 92 27.55 17.37 3.17 0.66           
Ownership & Agency
Widely-held 208 19.23 0.00 114 15.79 0.00 94 23.40 0.00 -0.08 0.17           
Blockholder 208 80.77 100.00 114 84.21 100.00 94 76.60 100.00 0.08 0.17           
Family 208 50.96 100.00 114 52.63 100.00 94 48.94 0.00 0.04 0.60           
Non-family blockholder 208 29.81 0.00 114 31.58 0.00 94 27.66 0.00 0.04 0.54           
Control-enhancing mechanism 208 39.42 0.00 114 47.37 0.00 94 29.79 0.00 0.18 0.01           
All Control Treated Difference of means
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Table 2 
Treatment effect on payout 
 
This table presents results of a difference-in-differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015. The 
explained variable is, alternatively, the dividend yield (DPS over stock price), dividend payout (DPS over EPS), 
total payout (dividends + repurchases over earnings) and the % of dividend payers. Treated denotes companies 
that can pay tax exempt dividends. (y-1) denotes the treatment effect one year before the tax cut, (y0) the year 
of the tax cut, (y+1) the year after the tax cut and (y2+) two and more years after the tax cut. Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets and Age the natural logarithm of company age. All specifications use industry clustered 
robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.665*** 9.221*** 9.889*** 6.725**
(3.152) (5.064) (4.527) (2.607)
Treated (y-1) 0.000 0.485 -1.406 -2.915
(0.001) (0.134) (-0.418) (-0.845)
Treated (y0) 0.473** 6.261* 6.336* 7.118*
(2.131) (1.777) (1.869) (1.704)
Treated (y+1) 0.913** 7.256** 7.448 7.574*
(2.296) (2.143) (1.686) (1.908)
Treated (y2+) 0.650** 11.267*** 11.449*** 4.919
(2.639) (4.328) (4.382) (1.590)
Size -0.116 -0.115 2.192 2.287 2.554 2.657 -0.010 -0.047
(-0.731) (-0.710) (0.823) (0.861) (0.850) (0.885) (-0.003) (-0.013)
Age 0.134 0.128 5.007 4.582 4.667 4.226 17.111 17.304
(0.246) (0.232) (0.717) (0.665) (0.632) (0.578) (1.327) (1.338)
Constant 3.210 3.227 -12.270 -12.855 -13.535 -13.951 6.610 7.191
(1.206) (1.201) (-0.272) (-0.287) (-0.258) (-0.268) (0.090) (0.097)
Observations 1,859 1,859 1,859 1,859 1,859 1,859 1,859 1,859
R-squared 0.620 0.620 0.575 0.576 0.564 0.565 0.688 0.688
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dividend Yield % PayersDividend Payout Total Payout
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Table 3 
Treatment effect on payout without late arrivals 
 
This table presents results of a difference-in-differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015 discarding 
companies which were treated after the shock. The explained variable is, alternatively, the dividend yield (DPS 
over stock price), dividend payout (DPS over EPS), total payout (dividends + repurchases over earnings) and the 
% of dividend payers. Treated denotes companies that can pay tax exempt dividends. (y-1) denotes the treatment 
effect one year before the tax cut, (y0) the year of the tax cut, (y+1) the year after the tax cut and (y2+) two and 
more years after the tax cut. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets and Age the natural logarithm of company 
age. All specifications use industry clustered robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.681*** 8.958*** 9.492*** 8.184**
(2.983) (3.603) (3.781) (2.463)
Treated (y-1) 0.004 0.572 -1.329 -2.485
(0.024) (0.158) (-0.394) (-0.724)
Treated (y0) 0.478** 6.333* 6.405* 7.504*
(2.155) (1.787) (1.882) (1.760)
Treated (y+1) 0.995** 6.831 6.676 6.884
(2.227) (1.545) (1.343) (1.549)
Treated (y2+) 0.686** 11.595*** 11.660*** 7.764*
(2.400) (3.260) (3.601) (1.723)
Size -0.181 -0.180 1.298 1.451 2.210 2.373 -0.378 -0.353
(-0.988) (-0.955) (0.396) (0.444) (0.597) (0.642) (-0.091) (-0.085)
Age -0.071 -0.094 4.663 3.682 5.242 4.232 21.160*** 21.060***
(-0.121) (-0.157) (0.675) (0.545) (0.666) (0.544) (3.020) (2.941)
Constant 4.959 5.039 2.755 2.985 -9.736 -9.292 -7.000 -6.753
(1.651) (1.667) (0.054) (0.058) (-0.157) (-0.150) (-0.108) (-0.104)
Observations 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681
R-squared 0.623 0.623 0.575 0.575 0.564 0.564 0.713 0.713
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dividend Yield % PayersDividend Payout Total Payout
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Table 4 
Treatment effect on payout over a restricted period and with late arrivals 
 
This table presents results of a difference-in-differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015 comparing 
the treatment effect over a shorter period between 2007 and 2011 (columns 1, 3 and 5) and treated firms with 
respect to late treated firms only (columns 2, 4 and 6). The explained variable is, alternatively, the dividend yield 
(DPS over stock price), dividend payout (DPS over EPS), total payout (dividends + repurchases over earnings) 
and the % of dividend payers. Treated denotes companies that can pay tax exempt dividends. Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets and Age the natural logarithm of company age. All specifications use industry clustered 
robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.457* 6.642** 7.328** 7.868*
(2.031) (2.110) (2.414) (1.861)
Treated vs. Late 0.608** 11.594*** 11.182*** 11.189*
(2.185) (3.143) (3.582) (1.847)
Size -0.099 -0.236 0.370 -0.270 2.624 2.878 3.064 0.632
(-0.657) (-1.084) (0.094) (-0.057) (0.608) (0.567) (0.851) (0.120)
Age 0.135 0.871 -15.612 -3.296 -19.413 -9.990 14.768 31.982**
(0.137) (0.858) (-0.865) (-0.179) (-0.963) (-0.470) (0.708) (2.068)
Constant 2.834 1.761 90.206 43.734 76.334 29.024 -31.126 -67.345
(0.691) (0.389) (1.136) (0.470) (0.886) (0.295) (-0.341) (-0.692)
Observations 1,049 675 1,049 675 1,049 675 1,049 675
R-squared 0.702 0.711 0.603 0.602 0.580 0.576 0.772 0.746
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dividend Yield % PayersDividend Payout Total Payout
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Table 5 
Treatment effect on payout after removing financial companies 
 
This table presents results of a difference-in-differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015 excluding 
all financial companies. The explained variable is, alternatively, the dividend yield (DPS over stock price), 
dividend payout (DPS over EPS), total payout (dividends + repurchases over earnings) and the % of dividend 
payers. Treated denotes companies that can pay tax exempt dividends. (y-1) denotes the treatment effect one 
year before the tax cut, (y0) the year of the tax cut, (y+1) the year after the tax cut and (y2+) two and more years 
after the tax cut. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets and Age the natural logarithm of company age. All 
specifications use industry clustered robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level respectively.  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.690*** 8.796*** 8.880*** 5.658*
(3.014) (3.563) (3.100) (1.789)
Treated (y-1) 0.029 1.079 -1.371 0.196
(0.131) (0.247) (-0.321) (0.046)
Treated (y0) 0.529** 7.292* 6.059 10.795*
(2.246) (1.840) (1.414) (1.953)
Treated (y+1) 0.771 4.607 4.260 5.276
(1.693) (1.083) (0.753) (1.079)
Treated (y2+) 0.736*** 11.365*** 10.979*** 3.917
(2.880) (3.225) (3.072) (1.055)
Size 0.101* 0.104* 5.743*** 5.824*** 6.402*** 6.508*** 4.136 4.018
(1.851) (1.866) (3.299) (3.395) (3.050) (3.143) (1.247) (1.189)
Age 0.392 0.378 7.436 7.008 7.324 6.751 30.931*** 31.495***
(0.659) (0.624) (0.959) (0.912) (0.817) (0.759) (2.966) (2.939)
Constant -1.154 -1.162 -70.564 -71.181 -75.460 -75.607 -106.894* -106.732
(-0.505) (-0.500) (-1.575) (-1.618) (-1.412) (-1.447) (-1.712) (-1.695)
Observations 1,338 1,338 1,338 1,338 1,338 1,338 1,338 1,338
R-squared 0.547 0.547 0.550 0.551 0.549 0.550 0.680 0.680
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dividend Yield % PayersDividend Payout Total Payout
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Table 6 
Treatment effect on corporate investment 
 
This table presents results of a difference-in-differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015 comparing 
treated firms to control firms (columns 1 and 5), treated firms to a control group discarding late arrivals (columns 
2 and 6), the treatment effect over a shorter period between 2007 and 2011 (columns 3 and 7) and treated firms to 
late treated firms only (columns 4 and 8). The explained variable is, alternatively, the natural logarithm of capex 
and the ratio of capex over lagged PPE. This ratio is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Treated denotes 
companies that can pay tax exempt dividends. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets and Age the natural 
logarithm of company age. All specifications use industry clustered robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.084 -2.120
(0.737) (-0.881)
Treated w/out late 0.093 -1.312
(0.676) (-0.570)
Treated 0.204 0.903
(1.439) (0.233)
Treated vs. Late 0.135 0.249
(0.792) (0.051)
Size 0.951*** 0.999*** 0.808*** 0.789*** -6.467 -2.497 -5.743 -7.520
(4.748) (4.497) (6.023) (6.200) (-1.440) (-0.808) (-0.964) (-1.184)
Age -0.518** -0.616* -0.457 -0.533 -6.600* -11.056* -12.996* -13.856*
(-2.105) (-1.980) (-1.255) (-1.436) (-2.023) (-1.941) (-1.789) (-1.785)
Constant -0.992 -1.179 0.443 0.968 134.331** 99.402* 145.481 172.145*
(-0.346) (-0.381) (0.174) (0.429) (2.111) (1.940) (1.670) (1.993)
Observations 1,396 1,273 810 535 1,326 1,204 755 516
R-squared 0.919 0.921 0.930 0.931 0.482 0.519 0.596 0.625
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
ln(capex) capex / PPE
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Table 7 
Treatment effect on financing sources  
 
This table presents results of a difference-in differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015 comparing 
treated firms to control firms (columns 1, 5 and 9), treated firms to a control group discarding late arrivals (columns 
2, 6 and 10), the treatment effect over a shorter period between 2006 and 2010 (columns 3, 7 and 11) and treated 
firms to late treated firms only (columns 4, 8 and 12). The explained variable is, alternatively, the natural logarithm 
of the book value of equity, the ratio of book value of equity over total assets, and cash & equivalents over total 
assets. Treated denotes companies that can pay tax exempt dividends. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets 
and Age the natural logarithm of company age. All specifications use industry clustered robust standard errors. *, 
**, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Treated 0.069 2.685 0.298
(0.779) (1.136) (0.243)
Treated w/out late 0.085 2.683 0.557
(0.782) (1.134) (0.428)
Treated 0.024 2.359 1.780
(0.198) (0.846) (0.913)
Treated vs. Late 0.087 2.793 -0.198
(0.468) (0.912) (-0.090)
Size 0.729*** 0.725*** 0.348** 0.401* 5.039** 5.014** 2.466 0.692 -1.122 -0.131 -0.397 -4.272***
(3.583) (3.133) (2.149) (2.030) (2.491) (2.281) (0.762) (0.281) (-0.640) (-0.078) (-0.111) (-5.487)
Age -0.135 -0.155 0.243 0.244 -4.434 -4.472 -2.004 2.820 -3.281 -3.972 -1.847 -0.432
(-0.487) (-0.505) (0.720) (0.618) (-1.010) (-0.916) (-0.321) (0.477) (-0.905) (-0.973) (-0.392) (-0.088)
Constant 3.381 3.494 6.922** 6.158* 0.810 1.246 27.476 30.333 47.309 36.603 30.838 78.973***
(1.276) (1.174) (2.727) (2.014) (0.029) (0.041) (0.778) (0.988) (1.677) (1.444) (0.695) (5.510)
Observations 1,396 1,275 811 536 1,408 1,285 814 536 1,406 1,283 812 536
R-squared 0.952 0.951 0.963 0.943 0.778 0.781 0.830 0.860 0.786 0.787 0.832 0.866
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cash & equiv / total assetsln(BV equity) BV equity / total assets
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    Table 8 
Agency costs 
 
This table presents results of a difference-in-differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015 for treated 
companies with a blockholder or being widely-held (columns 1, 3, 5 and 7) and depending on the presence of 
control-enhancing mechanisms in either group (columns 2, 4, 6 and 8). The explained variable is, alternatively, 
the dividend yield (DPS over stock price), dividend payout (DPS over EPS), total payout (dividends + repurchases 
over earnings) and the % of dividend payers. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets and Age the natural 
logarithm of company age. All specifications use industry clustered robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated (widely-held) 0.970** 12.686*** 13.209*** 14.517***
(2.487) (3.489) (3.176) (3.161)
Treated (widely-held with CEM) 0.913*** 16.245*** 18.324*** 27.275***
(8.224) (8.791) (9.660) (8.240)
Treated widely-held w/out CEM) 1.017** 13.002*** 13.589*** 14.488***
(2.417) (3.261) (2.947) (2.943)
Treated (blockholder) 0.583** 8.010*** 8.714*** 4.138*
(2.591) (4.425) (3.542) (1.794)
Treated (blockholder with CEM) 0.223 4.093 3.690 -0.410
(0.629) (0.923) (0.629) (-0.063)
Treated (blockholder w/out CEM) 0.793** 10.277*** 11.619*** 6.727*
(2.440) (3.448) (3.551) (1.950)
Size -0.163 -0.132 0.346 0.675 0.717 1.139 -2.574 -2.198
(-1.040) (-0.906) (0.150) (0.309) (0.254) (0.419) (-0.857) (-0.758)
Age 0.119 0.062 5.837 5.254 5.422 4.680 16.311 15.725
(0.211) (0.110) (0.839) (0.792) (0.727) (0.644) (1.263) (1.262)
Constant 3.953 3.759 10.346 8.101 9.315 6.418 46.359 43.486
(1.427) (1.394) (0.250) (0.206) (0.185) (0.135) (0.678) (0.654)
Observations 1,823 1,823 1,823 1,823 1,823 1,823 1,823 1,823
R-squared 0.617 0.619 0.576 0.577 0.565 0.566 0.688 0.689
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Yield Dividend Pay-out Total Pay-out % payers
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Figure 1 
Evolution of payout in Switzerland 
 
 
Panel A: Evolution of aggregate dividends and aggregate share repurchases 
 
Notes: This panel represents the total amount, in CHF billion, paid in dividends and share repurchases by 
firms listed on the Swiss stock exchange (SIX) to their shareholders. Source: Swiss National Bank 
 
 
Panel B: Percentage of firms paying dividends and repurchasing shares 
 
Notes: This panel represents the percentage of firms paying dividends, repurchasing, paying tax-exempted 
dividends or having a positive payout.  
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Figure 2: 
Impact of the dividend tax cut on payout 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: These figures represent the time series of annual average payout variable for firms in the treatment group 
(Treated) and in the control group (Control). Firms in the treatment group are firms that had recognized reserves 
from capital contribution in 2011 and were authorized to pay tax-exempted dividends, while those in the control 
group did not have such reserves and could not pay tax-exempted dividends. The year 2011 is post-reform. 
Dividend or total payout is, respectively, the fraction of earnings paid as dividends or as dividends and repurchases 
cumulated. Dividend yield is the dividend per share divided by the year-end price. Percentage of firms paying 
dividends is the fraction of firms paying a dividend to their shareholders in the control and treatment groups.  
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Figure 3 
Impact of the dividend tax cut on corporate investment, equity, and cash 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: These figures represent the time series of annual average payout variable for firms in the treatment group 
(Treated) and in the control group (Control). Firms in the treatment group are firms that had recognized reserves 
from capital contribution in 2011 and were authorized to pay tax-exempted dividends, while those in the control 
group did not have such reserve and could not pay tax-exempted dividends. The year 2011 is post-reform. 
Investments are measured as capex over lagged property, plant & equipment (PPE). All ratio variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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Figure 4 
Impact of the dividend tax cut on payout according to ownership structures 
 
 
 
 
Notes: These figures represent the time series of annual average payout variable for firms in the treatment group. 
Treated firms are divided into those that are widely-held (Treated WH) and that have one or several blockholders 
(Treated BH). We define blockholders using a 10% threshold. The year 2011 is post-reform. Dividend / total 
payout is the fraction of earnings paid as dividends or as dividends and repurchases cumulated. Dividend yield is 
the dividend per share divided by the year-end price. Percentage of firms paying dividends is the fraction of firms 
paying a dividend to their shareholders in the control and treatment groups. 
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Table A1 
Impact of the tax cut without late arrivals - without financial companies 
 
Notes: This table presents results of a difference-in-differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015 
discarding companies which were treated after the shock. We analyse the dividend yield (DPS over stock price), 
dividend payout (DPS over EPS), total payout (dividends + repurchases over earnings) and the % of dividend 
payers. Treated denotes companies exempt from paying dividend taxes. (y-1) denotes the treatment effect one 
year before the tax cut, (y0) the year of the tax cut, (y+1) the year after the tax cut and (y2+) two and more years 
after the tax cut. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets and Age the natural logarithm of company age. All 
specifications use industry clustered robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.749*** 8.214** 8.430** 9.344**
(2.931) (2.479) (2.549) (2.355)
Treated (y-1) 0.026 1.052 -1.411 0.104
(0.115) (0.239) (-0.327) (0.024)
Treated (y0) 0.533** 7.294* 6.032 10.875*
(2.252) (1.814) (1.396) (1.963)
Treated (y+1) 0.846* 2.977 2.593 4.914
(1.710) (0.562) (0.410) (0.931)
Treated (y2+) 0.861** 11.335** 11.397** 10.123*
(2.761) (2.325) (2.541) (2.004)
Size 0.076 0.082 5.560** 5.712** 6.917** 7.110*** 3.854 3.894
(1.117) (1.117) (2.643) (2.761) (2.665) (2.798) (1.109) (1.118)
Age 0.158 0.118 6.045 5.328 6.226 5.234 24.539*** 24.477***
(0.255) (0.187) (0.825) (0.743) (0.681) (0.580) (3.012) (2.896)
Constant 0.115 0.127 -60.785 -61.893 -76.222 -76.756 -81.284 -82.044
(0.048) (0.051) (-1.388) (-1.436) (-1.331) (-1.364) (-1.367) (-1.376)
Observations 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213
R-squared 0.552 0.553 0.553 0.555 0.551 0.553 0.705 0.705
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
% PayersDividend Yield Dividend Payout Total Payout
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Table A2 
Treatment effect on payout over a restricted period and with late arrivals - without financial 
companies 
 
This table presents results of a difference-in differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015 comparing the 
treatment effect over a shorter period between 2007 and 2011 (columns 1, 3 and 5) and treated firms to late treated 
firms only (columns 2, 4 and 6). We analyse the dividend yield (DPS over stock price), dividend payout (DPS 
over EPS), total payout (dividends + repurchases over earnings) and the % of dividend payers. Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets and Age the natural logarithm of company age. All specifications use industry clustered 
robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.509* 7.250* 6.718* 10.756*
(2.045) (1.885) (1.773) (1.918)
Treated vs. Late 0.566* 12.522** 10.064** 12.995
(1.803) (2.699) (2.781) (1.602)
Size 0.003 -0.049 2.974 2.807 5.467 6.206 3.988 2.726
(0.026) (-0.369) (1.067) (0.882) (1.579) (1.593) (0.976) (0.545)
Age 0.409 1.122 -11.828 1.131 -16.726 -7.213 21.231 39.104**
(0.368) (0.981) (-0.544) (0.050) (-0.680) (-0.270) (0.870) (2.295)
Constant -0.022 -2.243 35.418 -20.670 25.415 -28.051 -73.937 -129.727
(-0.005) (-0.463) (0.401) (-0.208) (0.261) (-0.261) (-0.690) (-1.289)
Observations 765 513 765 513 765 513 765 513
R-squared 0.649 0.640 0.585 0.584 0.576 0.571 0.764 0.733
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Total Payout % PayersDividend Yield Dividend Payout
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Table A3 
Treatment effect on payout – without largest or smallest companies 
 
This table presents results of a difference-in-differences OLS regression over the period 2006-2014. We analyse 
the dividend yield (DPS over stock price), dividend payout (DPS over EPS), total payout (dividends + repurchases 
over earnings) and the % of dividend payers. Treated denotes companies exempt from paying dividend taxes. (y-
1) denotes the treatment effect one year before the tax cut, (y0) the year of the tax cut, (y+1) the year after the tax 
cut and (y2+) two and more years after the tax cut. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets and age the natural 
logarithm of company age. Panel A (B) reports results for a sample without the top (bottom) quintile companies 
in terms of total assets. All specifications use industry clustered robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.723*** 9.156*** 8.689*** 6.742**
(3.314) (4.014) (3.309) (2.081)
Treated (y-1) -0.003 0.334 -2.085 -3.273
(-0.016) (0.090) (-0.585) (-0.734)
Treated (y0) 0.602** 7.710* 6.514 9.438*
(2.610) (1.982) (1.601) (1.865)
Treated (y+1) 0.946* 6.285 4.816 6.751
(1.908) (1.454) (0.953) (1.331)
Treated (y2+) 0.689*** 10.940*** 9.979*** 4.104
(3.036) (3.532) (3.182) (1.046)
Size -0.073 -0.074 2.817 2.897 3.267 3.370 1.058 0.981
(-0.461) (-0.453) (1.027) (1.053) (1.058) (1.088) (0.285) (0.262)
Age 0.180 0.180 2.202 1.925 2.565 2.221 17.026 17.337
(0.321) (0.318) (0.317) (0.277) (0.311) (0.271) (1.210) (1.224)
Constant 2.011 2.020 -14.137 -14.137 -16.719 -16.732 -0.956 -1.094
(0.865) (0.866) (-0.317) (-0.319) (-0.315) (-0.318) (-0.013) (-0.014)
Observations 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488
R-squared 0.604 0.604 0.580 0.581 0.573 0.574 0.677 0.677
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.614** 8.256*** 9.414*** 6.463**
(2.369) (3.758) (3.595) (2.262)
Treated (y-1) 0.063 -0.407 -2.276 -2.405
(0.331) (-0.099) (-0.624) (-0.601)
Treated (y0) 0.396 6.544 7.077* 7.638
(1.658) (1.632) (1.832) (1.641)
Treated (y+1) 0.779* 6.415 7.240 8.837**
(2.030) (1.548) (1.396) (2.261)
Treated (y2+) 0.666* 9.375*** 10.029*** 4.066
(1.958) (3.336) (3.364) (1.100)
Size -0.487** -0.481** -3.339 -3.265 -2.388 -2.326 -10.433* -10.556*
(-2.130) (-2.068) (-0.891) (-0.881) (-0.471) (-0.459) (-1.888) (-1.904)
Age 0.547 0.530 5.380 5.147 4.292 4.028 20.011 20.279
(0.855) (0.818) (0.567) (0.545) (0.446) (0.421) (1.125) (1.140)
Constant 6.910* 6.891* 62.487 62.321 58.944 59.096 161.416* 162.156*
(2.028) (2.002) (1.095) (1.103) (0.752) (0.758) (1.944) (1.945)
Observations 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488
R-squared 0.598 0.599 0.516 0.516 0.495 0.496 0.574 0.575
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dividend Yield Dividend Payout Total Payout % Payers
Panel A: sample without top quintile companies
Panel B: sample without bottom quintile companies
Dividend Yield Dividend Payout Total Payout % Payers
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Table A4 
Treatment effect on corporate investment – alternative winsorizing thresholds 
 
This table presents results of a difference-in-differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015 comparing 
treated firms to control firms (columns 1 and 5), treated firms to a control group discarding late arrivals (columns 
2 and 6), the treatment effect over a shorter period between 2007 and 2011 (columns 3 and 7) and treated firms to 
late treated firms only (columns 4 and 8). The explained variable is the ratio of capex over lagged PPE winsorized 
at the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles (columns 1 to 4) and at the 5 and 95 percentiles (columns 5 to 8). Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets and Age the natural logarithm of company age. All specifications use industry clustered 
robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 1.961 0.953
(0.606) (0.455)
Treated w/out late 3.006 1.192
(0.983) (0.559)
Treated 6.374 2.425
(1.275) (0.719)
Treated vs. Late 6.258 3.232
(1.350) (1.070)
Size -3.911 0.028 -7.659** -4.627 -2.882 -0.577 -6.558*** -4.055
(-1.201) (0.012) (-2.442) (-0.995) (-1.371) (-0.330) (-3.240) (-1.084)
Age -6.229 -12.439* -4.263 -5.647 -5.480 -10.202* -5.380 -6.056
(-1.642) (-1.944) (-0.572) (-0.781) (-1.379) (-1.784) (-1.103) (-1.264)
Constant 104.479** 75.513* 143.596** 106.755 85.980** 74.399** 131.931*** 99.449*
(2.159) (1.871) (2.349) (1.453) (2.482) (2.562) (4.238) (1.956)
Observations 1,362 1,238 516 773 1,362 1,238 516 773
R-squared 0.734 0.749 0.840 0.808 0.692 0.707 0.807 0.770
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
capex / PPE
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Table A5 
Treatment effect on financing options – alternative winsorizing thresholds 
 
This table presents results of a difference-in-differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015 comparing 
treated firms to control firms (columns 1 and 5), treated firms to a control group discarding late arrivals (columns 
2 and 6), the treatment effect over a shorter period between 2007 and 2011 (columns 3 and 7) and treated firms to 
late treated firms only (columns 4 and 8). The explained variable is the ratio of book value of equity over total 
assets (Panel A) and cash & equivalents over total assets (Panel B). The variables are winsorized at the 2.5-97.5% 
level in columns 1 to 4, and at the 5-95% level in columns 5 to 8. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets and 
Age the natural logarithm of company age. All specifications use industry clustered robust standard errors. *, **, 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 2.581 2.515
(1.115) (1.111)
Treated w/out late 2.564 2.664
(1.109) (1.177)
Treated 2.258 2.379
(0.828) (0.893)
Treated vs. Late 2.713 2.686
(0.924) (0.947)
Size 4.896** 4.868** 2.479 0.706 4.676** 4.610** 2.604 0.780
(2.540) (2.324) (0.795) (0.290) (2.486) (2.235) (0.851) (0.322)
Age -3.779 -3.877 -0.870 3.791 -2.952 -3.346 -0.577 4.111
(-0.928) (-0.844) (-0.151) (0.701) (-0.825) (-0.797) (-0.106) (0.788)
Constant 0.099 0.825 22.876 26.481 -0.422 1.861 19.693 23.989
(0.004) (0.028) (0.675) (0.870) (-0.016) (0.064) (0.593) (0.776)
Observations 1,408 1,285 814 536 1,408 1,285 814 536
R-squared 0.780 0.783 0.834 0.861 0.780 0.783 0.833 0.856
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.408 0.464
(0.341) (0.409)
Treated w/out late 0.614 0.581
(0.487) (0.481)
Treated 1.533 1.417
(0.839) (0.855)
Treated vs. Late -0.419 -0.291
(-0.193) (-0.150)
Size -1.291 -0.513 -0.562 -3.829*** -1.327 -0.861 -0.544 -3.322***
(-0.844) (-0.359) (-0.182) (-5.251) (-1.003) (-0.669) (-0.201) (-4.639)
Age -2.230 -2.687 -0.420 0.803 -1.225 -1.479 0.575 1.882
(-0.758) (-0.871) (-0.101) (0.185) (-0.526) (-0.662) (0.152) (0.472)
Constant 44.851* 36.144 27.155 68.070*** 40.731* 35.528* 22.460 56.388***
(1.819) (1.629) (0.718) (5.971) (1.908) (1.812) (0.673) (4.550)
Observations 1,406 1,283 812 536 1,406 1,283 812 536
R-squared 0.769 0.769 0.822 0.852 0.753 0.753 0.813 0.839
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Panel A: Treatment on book value of equity
BV equity / total assets
Panel B: Treatment on cash & equivalents
Cash & equiv / total assets
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Abstract
We study the effect of dividend taxes on the payout and investment policy of listed firms and discuss their implications 
for agency problems. To do so, we exploit a unique setting in Switzerland where some, but not all, firms were 
suddenly able to pay tax-exempted dividends to their shareholders following the corporate tax reform of 2011. Using 
a difference-in-differences specification, we show that treated firms increased their payout much more than control 
firms after the tax cut. Differently, treated firms did not concurrently or subsequently increase investment. We show 
that the tax-inelasticity of investment was due to a significant drop in retained earnings - as the rise in dividends was 
not compensated by an equally-sized reduction in share repurchases. Furthermore, treated firms did not raise more 
equity and/or did not reduce their cash holdings to compensate for the contraction in retained earnings. Finally, we 
show that an unintended consequence of cutting dividend taxes is to mitigate the agency problems that arise between 
insiders and minority shareholders.
Citation proposal
Dušan Isakov, Christophe Pérignon, Jean-Philippe Weisskopf. 2018. «What if dividends were tax-exempt? Evidence from a 
natural experiment». Working Papers SES 498, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Fribourg (Switzerland)
Jel Classification
G35, G38, H25, K34.
Keywords 
Corporate taxes, dividends, payouts, investment, agency problems.
Last published
491 Eugster N.: Family Firms and Financial Analyst Activity; 2017
492  Andresen M.E., Huber M.: Instrument-based estimation with binarized treatments: Issues and tests for the exclusion 
restriction; 2018
493 Bodory H., Huber M.: The causalweight package for causal inference in R; 2018
494 Huber M., Imhof D.: Machine Learning with Screens for Detecting Bid-Rigging Cartels; 2018
495 Hsu Y.-C., Huber M., Lee Y.-Y.: Direct and indirect effects of continuous treatments based on generalized propensity score 
weighting; 2018
496 Huber M., Solovyeva A.: Direct and indirect effects under sample selection and outcome attrition; 2018
497 Huber M., Solovyeva A.: On the sensitivity of wage gap decompositions; 2018
Catalogue and download links
http://www.unifr.ch/ses/wp                          
http://doc.rero.ch/collection/WORKING_PAPERS_SES 
Publisher
Working Paper 498 november 2018
